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Product Description
Tragedies similar to a Columbia mess have been pathetic reminders which things can go wrong in large, rarely regarded organizations. Although you welcome brand new technologies eagerly, you have been demure to accept a risks of innovation. Moreover, a little technologies as well as organizations might be as well formidable to carry out effectively. What creates a little organizations some-more disposed to accidents? Do a really measures taken to enlarge reserve minister to accidents? Can societies, organizations, as well as people sense from failures as well as revoke risks?
Against this backdrop, Professors William H. Starbuck of New York University as well as Moshe Farjoun of York University have invited different experts to minister insights about a Columbia collision as well as a organizational lessons it suggests. This book to illustrate presents most viewpoints upon a formidable behavioral factors which led to disaster.
Average Ratings : 5.0
Price : $41.86
Mr. Andrew Evans
Posted on March 1st, 2010 at 12:23 amA series of powerful essays from an excellent and diverse range of writers including the initial ideas on resilience engineering. Covers issues of communications over the imagery requests well.
Rating: 5 / 5
Howard Aldrich
Posted on March 1st, 2010 at 12:31 amAfter two horrible disasters, do you think that NASA has learned from its mistakes, and that it will never happen again? If so, you need to read this book! In 18 well-written chapters, the editors have assembled a set of experts on organizations and disasters to analyze lessons from the Columbia disaster. Because the Challenger disaster foreshadowed many of the problems that subsequently turned up in official investigations of the Columbia disaster, it also figures heavily in this edited book. The authors demonstrate the analytic power of an historically informed organizational analysis of a large governmental agency under strong political pressure to produce results with limited resources.
Two points in particular caught my eye. First, after the Challenger disaster, NASA was supposedly reorganized to place greater emphasis on safety. However, because the organization began to define the space exploration program as a problem of meeting production goals and deadlines, “safety” never achieved the priority in the organization than it deserved. Instead of seeing the space shuttle program as a developmental one, exploring the risky frontier of technological knowledge, NASA officials treated it like any other flight program. Second, as anomalies continued to crop up after flights, engineers and officials began to think about deviations from acceptable practices and outcomes as “normal.” As deviation was normalized, unusual events were taken for granted and didn’t provoke the kind of response than one would expect from life threatening occurrences.
Scholars interested in organization studies, organizational learning, systems theory, and other academic disciplines will learn much from this book. However, one can also hope that public officials will take its lessons to heart and look more closely at the design of other risky systems that are operating close to the limits of our scientific knowledge.
Rating: 5 / 5