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	<title>Comments on: ORGANIZATION AT THE LIMIT: LESSONS FROM THE COLUMBIA DISASTER</title>
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	<link>http://www.homegymequipments.info/fitness-lesson/organization-at-the-limit-lessons-from-the-columbia-disaster.html</link>
	<description>Make fitness gym in your home</description>
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		<title>By: Howard Aldrich</title>
		<link>http://www.homegymequipments.info/fitness-lesson/organization-at-the-limit-lessons-from-the-columbia-disaster.html/comment-page-1#comment-507</link>
		<dc:creator>Howard Aldrich</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 00:31:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>After two horrible disasters, do you think that NASA has learned from its mistakes, and that it will never happen again?  If so, you need to read this book!  In 18 well-written chapters, the editors have assembled a set of experts on organizations and disasters to analyze lessons from the Columbia disaster.  Because the Challenger disaster foreshadowed many of the problems that subsequently turned up in official investigations of the Columbia disaster, it also figures heavily in this edited book.  The authors demonstrate the analytic power of an historically informed organizational analysis of a large governmental agency under strong political pressure to produce results with limited resources.
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;Two points in particular caught my eye.  First, after the Challenger disaster, NASA was supposedly reorganized to place greater emphasis on safety.  However, because the organization began to define the space exploration program as a problem of meeting production goals and deadlines, &quot;safety&quot; never achieved the priority in the organization than it deserved.  Instead of seeing the space shuttle program as a developmental one, exploring the risky frontier of technological knowledge, NASA officials treated it like any other flight program.  Second, as anomalies continued to crop up after flights, engineers and officials began to think about deviations from acceptable practices and outcomes as &quot;normal.&quot;  As deviation was normalized, unusual events were taken for granted and didn&#039;t provoke the kind of response than one would expect from life threatening occurrences.
&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;Scholars interested in organization studies, organizational learning, systems theory, and other academic disciplines will learn much from this book.  However, one can also hope that public officials will take its lessons to heart and look more closely at the design of other risky systems that are operating close to the limits of our scientific knowledge.
Rating: 5 / 5</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After two horrible disasters, do you think that NASA has learned from its mistakes, and that it will never happen again?  If so, you need to read this book!  In 18 well-written chapters, the editors have assembled a set of experts on organizations and disasters to analyze lessons from the Columbia disaster.  Because the Challenger disaster foreshadowed many of the problems that subsequently turned up in official investigations of the Columbia disaster, it also figures heavily in this edited book.  The authors demonstrate the analytic power of an historically informed organizational analysis of a large governmental agency under strong political pressure to produce results with limited resources.</p>
<p>Two points in particular caught my eye.  First, after the Challenger disaster, NASA was supposedly reorganized to place greater emphasis on safety.  However, because the organization began to define the space exploration program as a problem of meeting production goals and deadlines, &#8220;safety&#8221; never achieved the priority in the organization than it deserved.  Instead of seeing the space shuttle program as a developmental one, exploring the risky frontier of technological knowledge, NASA officials treated it like any other flight program.  Second, as anomalies continued to crop up after flights, engineers and officials began to think about deviations from acceptable practices and outcomes as &#8220;normal.&#8221;  As deviation was normalized, unusual events were taken for granted and didn&#8217;t provoke the kind of response than one would expect from life threatening occurrences.</p>
<p>Scholars interested in organization studies, organizational learning, systems theory, and other academic disciplines will learn much from this book.  However, one can also hope that public officials will take its lessons to heart and look more closely at the design of other risky systems that are operating close to the limits of our scientific knowledge.<br />
Rating: 5 / 5</p>
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		<title>By: Mr. Andrew Evans</title>
		<link>http://www.homegymequipments.info/fitness-lesson/organization-at-the-limit-lessons-from-the-columbia-disaster.html/comment-page-1#comment-506</link>
		<dc:creator>Mr. Andrew Evans</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2010 00:23:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>A series of powerful essays from an excellent and diverse range of writers including the initial ideas on resilience engineering. Covers issues of communications over the imagery requests well.
Rating: 5 / 5</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A series of powerful essays from an excellent and diverse range of writers including the initial ideas on resilience engineering. Covers issues of communications over the imagery requests well.<br />
Rating: 5 / 5</p>
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